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Abstract 
From 1961 to 2011, Barbados’s GDP per capita grew roughly two times faster than Jamaica’s. 
As a result, the income gap between Barbados and Jamaica is now more than three times larger 
than at the time of independence. Qualitative historical analysis, exploiting the interplay between 
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pro-entrepreneurial policies in Barbados versus anti-business policies in Jamaica explain in part 
the economic divergence of these two islands. 
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Introduction 
 
To a certain extent, macroeconomic indicators abstract from daily experience. National statistics 
conceal the all-important fact that the growth of an economy is the amalgamated outcome of a 
large number of micro actors that come together in just the right way to edge an economy 
forward. In the most successful economies, these actors interact and, more importantly, transact, 
in an efficient way. In countries that lag behind, these interactions and transactions are slow and 
strenuous, if they happen at all. A number of factors influence the ease with which these 
interactions occur (e.g. institutions and infrastructure); but policy is first among equals. 
Along a continuum, governments can choose policies that act as enablers or disablers of 
the private sector. Over the past three decades, most governments have shifted toward the 
enabling end of the continuum, from economies where the state exerts great control over the 
means of production and allocation of resources to market economies buoyed by entrepreneurial 
initiative. In disabling economic environments, governments act as gatekeepers, implementing 
policy measures that serve as barriers to private sector activity. In contrast, enabling economic 
environments are those in which officials constantly seek new ways to promote firm 
development and harness the power of the market. The growth narratives of Jamaica and 
Barbados illustrate the power of shifting from a disabling policy stance to an enabling one—a 
process that unleashes the capacity of the entrepreneur to create value for business and society. 
In this world of national economies, where perfectly controlled laboratory experiments do 
not exist, Barbados and Jamaica are as close to twins as you are likely to find. Small tropical 
islands colonized by the British and primarily inhabited by the descendants of African slaves 
who were brought to the Caribbean to cultivate sugar, these two islands gained independence 
four years apart (Barbados in 1966 and Jamaica in 1962). From their virtually identical colonial 
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origins, the two countries inherited the same fundamental institutions: Westminster 
Parliamentary Democracy, constitutionally protected private property, and English Common 
Law. Given the largely indistinguishable initial conditions of Barbados and Jamaica at their 
independence, institutional theories of development predict that these two countries should have 
experienced similar economic trajectories,1
Previous research finds that differences in macroeconomic policy, not institutions, 
explain much of the divergence in growth (Worrell 1981; Henry and Miller 2008). Under the 
leadership of Michael Manley, the Jamaican government nationalized core industries, pursued 
policies of import substitution, and ran large budget deficits, causing the country’s GDP per 
capita to contract by 4.6 percent per year from 1973–1980 (Table 1). The economy of Barbados, 
on the other hand, grew by 2.5 percent per year (Table 1) during the same period of time by 
pursuing policies that eschewed extensive government ownership, favored free trade, and 
maintained fiscal restraint. 
 but this is not the case. From 1961 to 2011, 
Barbados’s GDP per capita grew roughly two times as fast as Jamaica’s (Figure 1). As a result, 
the income gap between Barbados and Jamaica is now more than three times larger than at the 
time of independence. The lion’s share of this divergence in living standards occurred between 
1973 and 1987, when Jamaica’s economy contracted by 2.4 percent per year while Barbados’s 
grew by 1.5 percent per year. In other words, for fifteen years, income per capita in Barbados 
grew by 3.8 percentage points faster than Jamaica’s. 
But a macroeconomic account alone is insufficient to understand the complexities of the 
growth narratives of Jamaica and Barbados. Building on previous work, this paper uses the 1973 
oil price shock as a natural experiment to examine the impact of policy choices on each country’s 
                                                          
1 See, for example, North (1990). 
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microeconomic setting. Specifically, we use qualitative historical data to compare the impact that 
the policy choices of each nation’s leadership had on local entrepreneurs. Our investigation 
reveals that differing policy choices in times of crisis have a substantial impact on 
entrepreneurial activity. Where Jamaican policymakers and politicians hindered entrepreneurs, 
Barbadian policymakers and politicians enabled them. From divergent choices came divergent 
outcomes—a constrained and lackluster entrepreneurial environment in Jamaica and a 
comparatively strong entrepreneurial environment in Barbados. The effects of these policy 
choices in the years immediately following the 1973 oil crisis continue to exert a profound 
impact on these economies today. 
 
Two Islands, One Tale: Pre-1973 Entrepreneurship 
 
In the mid-1930s, the Nobel Laureate Caribbean economist Sir Arthur Lewis was a student at the 
London School of Economics (LSE). A native of St. Lucia, he was intimately aware of the need 
for economic development in the Caribbean, where the demands of a colonial plantation 
economy had resulted in economically dependent, agriculturally based societies with excess 
labor. While attending the LSE, Lewis would spend hours in the Colonial Office Library 
“reading reports from the colonial territories on agricultural problems, mining, currency 
questions and the like, and [learning] about the efficacy of different policies” (Lewis 1992). As 
he progressed through his studies and began teaching at the University of Manchester, he 
developed his own policy prescriptions for the development of Caribbean economies—ideas 
most notably discussed in two of his works, Industrialisation of the British West Indies (1950) 
and “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour” (1954). 
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Lewis’s prescription for the Caribbean, dubbed “industrialization by invitation,” centered 
on the acquisition of foreign capital and the use of incentives in order to promote “export-led” 
industrialization. In his assessment of industrialization by invitation, Andrew Downes (2004) 
identifies six fundamental elements of Lewis’s prescription: 
1. Focus on the international export market, 
2. Pursuit of policy measures to make products internationally competitive, 
3. Strategic alliances with foreign industrialists, 
4. A key role for the state in defining policy, 
5. Investments in human resource development, and 
6. Use of local resources, such as agriculture and tourism. 
 
Under a policy of industrialization by invitation, governments enable entrepreneurs by removing 
the barriers to economic activity and providing incentives (such as investment capital and import 
tariff exemptions) to start new businesses. 
 For much of the 1950s and 1960s, Jamaica and Barbados initiated economic policies in 
the spirit of Lewis’s industrialization by invitation and both nations experienced rapid economic 
growth, diversification of industry, and increased labor force participation. However, long before 
Lewis formalized his theory, entrepreneurs, politicians, and other officials from the 1930s had 
begun laying the groundwork for independent economic activity in each country. 
Following the drop in prices for sugar—the major export commodity in both countries—
during the Great Depression, wages suffered and labor riots spread throughout the Caribbean. 
Increasingly, black Caribbean writers, journalists, and popular figures made visible the plight of 
the masses of unemployed and disaffected West Indians. Soon a nationalist movement gained 
traction, and demands for independence from colonial powers rippled through the Caribbean. But 
if such independence were to come, West Indian societies believed that the transition from 
dependent plantation economies to independent industrial economies must come as well. While 
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the meaning and extent of cultural nationalism varied across the two islands,2
In the case of Jamaica, the 1944 constitution, largely a concession to the 1930s riots and 
agitation for self-government, was the first step in removing barriers to entrepreneurship and 
industrialization within the country. The constitution and later amendments gave local Jamaicans 
greater political power and enabled the local government to begin formulating policy outside of 
the colonial economic system. By 1952, the government had established the Industrial 
Development Corporation, which moderated barriers to business development. In addition, 
several laws—the Pioneer Industry Act (1949), the Industrial Incentives Law (1956), the Export 
Industry Encouragement Law (1956), and the Hotel (Incentive) Act (1968)—offered tax breaks 
and incentives to encourage various industries. 
 the underlying 
discontent experienced in Jamaica and Barbados spurred both countries to try to strengthen and 
transform their economies. Their attempts to do so became more rigorous and sustained in the 
1950s as Lewis and other economists provided the theoretical grounding for both nations to 
develop policies intended to court foreign capital, provide incentives and tax breaks to 
entrepreneurs, and develop manufacturing and tourism industries they believed would ensure 
their future economic independence. 
Barbados implemented similar policies during the same period. As in Jamaica, local 
entrepreneurs eager for greater self-governance led the way in convincing the colonial 
                                                          
2 See Barrow and Greene (1979), Patterson (1982), and Robotham (2010) for in-depth discussions of the historical 
and cultural reasons for the differences between Jamaican and Barbadian societies’ embrace (or alternatively, 
rejection) of black nationalist ideologies. Some scholars have argued that because the population ratio of slave to 
white was higher in Jamaica than Barbados, Jamaican society is less cohesive and more racially divisive than 
Barbadian society, where the white and black populations were forced to get along and establish a more racially 
integrated social system after the abolition of slavery. While a cultural analysis of the two nations adds to the 
narrative of their policy divergence, we believe that policy choices provide a more direct mechanism for explaining 
economic divergence. In other words, cultural differences may affect economic divergence, but the effect would 
mostly flow through the construction and implementation of policies. 
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government to enable a more robust and diversified economy. In 1940, a Barbadian businessman 
named Wynter Crawford began what would evolve into more than three decades of policy 
advocacy on behalf of the private sector. A conversation with an American businessman 
prompted Crawford to approach the colonial authorities requesting an incentive program (Carter 
2008). In 1957, the Barbadian government created a development board, similar to Jamaica’s 
Industrial Development Corporation, that within its first ten years of operation extended eighty-
nine loans to individuals and companies to promote tourism and manufacturing enterprises 
(Downes 1993). Further, as in Jamaica, Barbados passed several laws to incentivize 
development—the Industrial Incentives Act (1963), the Industrial Development (Export 
Industries) Act (1963), and the International Business Companies Act (1965). 
The results of these efforts speak for themselves. In Jamaica, the manufacturing sector 
took off. For example, in 1949, the apparel industry met less than 20 percent of the citizenry’s 
needs; but by 1955, that number rose to 80 percent, with  some fifty garment factories employing 
3,000 workers and an estimated 46,000 “cottage-type” (or “necessity”) entrepreneurs operating 
businesses out of their homes using private sewing machines (“Garment Industry Rises” 1955). 
Tourism in Jamaica also grew during the period. From 1955 to 1972, total visitor expenditures 
rose from US$15.1 million to US$134.7 million, an average annual increase of 47 percent over 
the period; the number of hotels tripled over the period from 1945 to 1970 (Meditz and Hanratty 
1987; Stone and Wellisz 1993). The rise in tourism also triggered a rise in a number of 
complementary businesses, such as food suppliers and transportation providers, run by local 
entrepreneurs.3
                                                          
3 While local entrepreneurs took part in the tourism industry, one should not overstate their participation. Jamaica’s 
hotels sourced only 30 percent of hotel food supplies from local suppliers in 1968, reflecting the relatively low 
 Additionally, in 1952, Jamaica began to produce bauxite thanks to foreign firms 
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like the American company Reynolds Metals Limited, the first bauxite mining company on the 
island. Later, the production of bauxite would constitute the most significant industry in Jamaica, 
making Jamaica the number one producer of bauxite in the world in the late 1950s. 
Foreign firms’ ability to enter the marketplace was just as integral to Barbados’s success 
as it was to Jamaica’s. Aided by its own Pioneer Industries Act (1951), Barbados enabled the 
formation of both local and foreign-owned businesses. Beginning in the 1940s and into the 
1950s, many bottling companies were established—Barbados Bottling Company Ltd. (1944), 
Bottlers (Barbados) Limited (1954), and Banks (Barbados) Breweries (1960s). Other packaging 
companies also made Barbados home. In 1955, local Barbadians L. G. and Sylvia Hutchinson 
started ECAF Products Limited, the company credited with the introduction of hygienically 
sealed bags of consumables to the island nation. Moreover, following the two major industrial 
acts passed in 1963, the establishment of forty-four factories led to the generation of more than 
2,000 jobs (Beckles 2006). In addition to these light manufacturing companies, tourism followed 
the same generative path witnessed in Jamaica. The industry went from a state of near 
nonexistence in the early part of the twentieth century to being an integral part of the economy in 
the 1960s. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, more than 200,000 tourists arrived in Barbados 
each year, contributing on average more than 12 percent of GDP (“National Adaptation 
Strategy” 2010) and the majority of total foreign exchange earning—two figures that do not 
include the indirect contribution of tourist expenditures from sources other than hotel and travel 
receipts. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
tourism multiplier of the island compared to other small island economies. Some estimate that Jamaica keeps only 
50 cents on every dollar spent in the tourism industry (Belisle 1984; Litvin and Fyffe 2008). 
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In the aggregate, these firm-level activities added up to growth in both nations. Jamaica 
saw real GDP per capita growth of 3.6 percent per annum from 1962 to 1968 and 4.6 percent per 
annum from 1969 to 1973. Barbados saw moderately stronger growth over the full period (see 
Figure 1). From the 1950s to the 1970s, these aggregate gains had less and less to do with 
productivity in agriculture and more and more to do with gains in the industries encouraged by 
enabling policies. Tables 2 and 3 show the composition of GDP in each nation, revealing a 
considerable drop in agriculture as a percent of GDP and a gain in construction, manufacturing, 
retail, and financial industries. 
Because of the enabling policies of successive governments, at the beginning of the 
1970s, Jamaica and Barbados found themselves in enviable positions. But in 1973, the external 
environment suddenly turned less favorable as events thousands of miles away from the blue 
waters of the Caribbean disrupted the growth trajectory of both countries and forced their leaders 
to make difficult choices about the path forward—choices that would impact the entrepreneurial 
environment, for better and for worse. 
 
One Shock, Two Responses: Post-1973 Entrepreneurship 
In October of 1973, and in part as retaliation for U.S. involvement in the Arab-Israeli War, the 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) initiated an embargo that tripled 
the price of oil and precipitated the global recession of 1974–75. As the world economy slowed, 
tourist arrivals declined, and the economies of Barbados and Jamaica were hit simultaneously 
with declining foreign exchange earnings and the rising cost of fuel. The multipronged hit to 
these small island economies conspired to reduce growth and drive up inflation (see Table 1). 
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Faced with this crisis, the leadership of each country had to decide how best to respond. 
The Barbadian government decided to engage the West and continue policies aligned with 
Lewis’s industrialization by invitation. The Jamaican government took the opposite course, 
attempting to close off its economy and direct the allocation of scarce economic resources by 
seizing the commanding heights of the economy. These differing policy choices would define 
Barbados’s relative success for more than a decade after the crisis—and Jamaica’s precipitous 
decline. 
 
Rhetorical Policies 
 
Before the implementation of policies come the rhetorical flourishes of leaders. Leaders use 
words, ideas, and values to set the direction and tone of public discourse and to encourage their 
constituents and colleagues in government to adopt policies that they believe will ultimately 
deliver on their vision for the country. As Giandomenico Majone (1989) argues in his book 
Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Process, “public policy is made of language 
[…] Political parties, the electorate, the legislature, the executive, the courts, the media, interest 
groups, and independent experts all engage in a continuous process of debate and reciprocal 
persuasion.” An increasing body of literature on political economy documents that absent any 
real or tangible policy change, the words and ideas of politicians can and do have an independent 
effect on economic activity by shaping the expectations of consumers and businesses, both 
foreign and domestic.4
                                                          
4 See, for example, Wood, Owens, and Durham (2005). In this study, the authors find that presidential rhetoric 
“significantly affect[s] people’s perceptions of the economic news, as well as their confidence about current and 
future economic conditions” (642). 
 Truer words were never spoken about Barbados and Jamaica. Emerging 
as they were from the turbulent social and cultural dynamics of the 1960s, each nation engaged 
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in often heated political dialogue and rhetoric, or what we term “rhetorical policies,” in the 
aftermath of the 1973 oil price shock.5
In Jamaica, Michael Manley’s charisma and ability to appeal to and capture the energy of 
the black power movements and socialist ideology sweeping the Caribbean in the 1960s 
contributed greatly to his electoral victory in 1972. The son of the founder of the People’s 
National Party (PNP) and self-described “socialist” Norman Manley, Michael Manley chanted 
“better must come” to large crowds of working- and middle-class Jamaicans fed up with the 
corruption, economic inequality, and political suppression under the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), 
in power in the 1960s.
 
6
In the fall of 1974, after a meeting with the PNP, Manley announced his “democratic 
socialist” vision for Jamaica—a formalized embodiment of his “moral” belief in “social justice 
for all people” (King 2008, 42). Democratic socialism as outlined by Manley was an ideological 
shift to the left and away from the Lewis model of industrialization by invitation.
 While Manley’s electoral rhetoric gave Jamaicans a sense for his policy 
proclivities, it was not until the period immediately following the oil shock crisis that his rhetoric 
turned into rhetorical policies. 
7
                                                          
5 For a more in-depth discussion of the role of rhetorical policies versus tangible or “real” policies in Jamaica under 
Manley and Edward Seaga, see Stephens and Stephens (1989). 
 As it pertained 
to the economy, democratic socialism had a few major components: (1) a non-aligned foreign 
policy intended to foster Third World cooperation and unity instead of dependence on the West; 
6 During the 1960s, the JLP discouraged political dissent, ever wary of the resurgent cultural and racial nationalism 
in the West Indies during the time period. Stephens and Stephens (1986) describe the JLP as “heavy hand[ed] 
towards political dissent, such as the banning of the scholar Walter Rodney and other radical figures, censorship of 
radio programs, withdrawal of passports of persons who had visited Cuba, bans on books, etc.” (45). For an 
excellent narrative of the Walter Rodney Affair and an illustrative example of suppression by the JLP government, 
see Gonsalves (1979). 
7 For a content-analysis comparison of Manley’s socialist rhetoric as compared to his successor Edward Seaga’s 
capitalist rhetoric, see Brown (1982). 
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(2) national control over economic resources to aid in redistributive economic policies; and (3) 
popular appeals to workers, often in contrast to the middle and upper classes, and in support of 
free and fair democracy (Stephens and Stephens 1986; Levi 1990). Manley pursued these 
rhetorical policies by re-engaging with Cuba; encouraging Third World economic cooperation in 
speeches throughout the Caribbean, South America, and Africa; criticizing Western economic 
institutions; and even stating in an oft-quoted speech, “Jamaica has no room for millionaires.” 
The Prime Minister’s rhetorical policy regime surprised many of his supporters, even angering 
some, particularly those in the business community. 
A 1974 editorial in the Jamaica Daily Gleaner argued that the government “has created 
certain doubts, real or imaginary, as to the place of the private sector in the future of the 
economy. It is important to note that businessmen are affected by real and imaginary factors” 
(“Business” 1974). The same article concludes that the relationship between the government and 
the private sector is as one between “enemies.” Even outside of the editorial pages of the 
Gleaner (which exhibits a history of conservative commentary), everyday entrepreneurs 
expressed similar concerns about Manley’s rhetorical stance. In his biography of Manley, Darrell 
E. Levi (1990) describes a near-hysterical fear on the part of many in the business community 
who believed, based on little other evidence than Manley’s rhetoric, that Jamaica was “going 
communist,” as one Chinese-Jamaican grocer put it. 
Pamphlets and rumors spread throughout Jamaican society, and small-business owners 
and entrepreneurs fled the country. Harrison (1988) describes the reaction to Manley’s rhetorical 
and real policies: 
Fearing that Jamaica would move further leftward and expropriate investments, foreign 
and domestic capitalists, largely through the agency of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) 
opposition, mobilized a destabilization campaign to undermine the legitimacy of the PNP 
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administration and oust it from office (Keith and Girling, 1978:29). Bauxite companies 
cut back production and filed a litigation suit; the American press discouraged tourism, 
Jamaica’s second largest foreign exchange earner; local capitalists cut back production 
and, in many cases, closed down business and fled the island with their capital; and 
international commercial banks ceased making loans to Jamaica (p. 105). 
 
For many entrepreneurs and middle-class Jamaicans, there was a real fear about the future of the 
country. Recounting how “middle class professionals […] migrated in hordes,” the legal scholar 
E. M. Brown (2000) notes in a piece in the Los Angeles Times that the Jamaicans who fled “were 
leaving not only for ideological reasons but, more important, to safeguard their children’s 
futures.” More than 100,000 Jamaicans chose to “go foreign” from 1976 to 1980, and in 1977 the 
number of administrators and managers migrating to the U.S. jumped by a factor of four 
(Koslofsky 1981). This exodus was perhaps most pronounced among the Chinese-Jamaican 
community. In 1970, there were 11,780 Chinese in Jamaica. By 1980, that number had fallen to 
5,320, less than half the previous amount—a drop that is in part, though certainly not wholly, 
attributable to Manley’s rhetorical policies during the decade (Look Lai 1998). 
The policy rhetoric in Barbados never reached the fever pitch it hit in Jamaica. Faced 
with the same pressures as Jamaica—demands for racial and class equity in the face of an oil 
price shock—the leadership of Barbados took the opposite rhetorical policy path, pursuing an 
unequivocally close relationship with the West and reasserting support for capitalism, the free 
market, and Lewis’s industrialization by invitation. 
In the 1960s, Barbados, like Jamaica, faced domestic pressure to incorporate the black 
masses into the polity and economy through direct appeals to black power and socialist ideology. 
Although such ideologies, as embodied by the Barbadian People’s Progressive Movement 
(PPM), failed to gain widespread appeal in the nation, the lack of economic opportunities for 
blacks necessitated that the two mainstream political parties—the Barbados Labour Party (BLP) 
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and the Democratic Labour Party (DLP)—pay “at least lip service to these aspirations” (Will 
2008, 138). While BLP leader Grantley Adams declared an “assault on the oligarchy” (Layne 
1979, 46) in the 1950s and DLP member Frank Walcott referred to the almost exclusively white 
business sector as a form of “apartheid” (Will 2008, 139), the rhetoric did not go further than 
abstract acknowledgment of racial, economic, and social inequality. In fact, the conservative 
government, under the leadership of the DLP and Errol Barrow, the nation’s first prime minister, 
passed the Barbadian Public Order Act of 1970—a piece of legislation meant to limit the 
assembly, free speech, and other activities of any individual or group determined by the 
government to be militant, radical, and/or racist (against the white, and economically powerful, 
minority). 
While the suppression of black power, socialism, and agitation for equality in the 1960s 
arguably cost the JLP the 1972 elections in Jamaica, this suppression had little political cost for 
the Barrow administration in Barbados. Although Barbadians pushed back against the Public 
Order Act by protesting that their rights to assembly and speech be restored, by the time the 
election of 1971 rolled around, they chose to stay the course and re-elected Barrow’s 
conservative-leaning government. 
Barrow’s rhetorical policies in response to the oil crisis were the opposite of Manley’s. 
Unlike Manley, Barrow refused to engage in any meaningful rapprochement with Cuba, 
maintained close ties with the West (particularly Britain and the United States), and refused to 
assent to populist rhetoric. In an article comparing Barrow’s rhetoric with Manley’s, the Jamaica 
Sunday Gleaner wrote: 
Compared to Manley, Barrow was so leery of the possible negative impact of certain 
kinds of rhetoric that he imposed the Public Order Act of 1970 to deal with the black 
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radical upsurge that might have resulted from Black Power ideology that was taking hold 
in the region at that time. 
 
Barrow was aware that the capital accumulation strategy that he was following was built 
upon, among other things, foreign investor confidence, and American tolerance, if not 
indulgence, and this could not tolerate a black radical upsurge. It is in this light that 
Hillbourne Watson comments that Barrow knew how to take the pulse of popular 
sentiment and how to demobilise it (“The Failure” 2006). 
 
If Manley believed that Jamaica had “no room for millionaires,” Barrow believed Barbados was 
the place for them. In a speech just before the 1971 election, Barrow commented that black 
power supporters were “the biggest collection of misfits and dropouts from society he had ever 
seen [and were…] against anybody who [was] successful” (Will 2008, 140). His rhetorical 
strategy was calculated, in that its aim was to foster inclusion within the capitalist system rather 
than find an alternative to it. His rhetoric was meant for the “explicit purpose of allaying the 
concerns of the foreign investors, the tourists, the black middle strata and the local whites” 
(Hilbourne 2001, 66). Barrow’s rhetorical support for entrepreneurs did not go unnoticed by 
local Barbadians. Speaking at the 2011 annual Sir Harold Bernard St. John Lecture, the former 
president of the Barbados Hotel and Tourism Association and current resort owner Alvin 
Jemmott noted of Barrow: “The freeing up of the capital markets was significant to the growth of 
the local entrepreneurs; former Prime Minister Errol Barrow had the view that local people 
should have access to capital at better terms than foreigners should” (“Local Entrepreneurs 
Responsible” 2011). Barrow’s rhetorical support was so strong that by the mid-1970s, many 
began to perceive Barrow as supporting the (mostly white) business elite at the expense of, rather 
than in addition to, the black working class. This change in perception cost the DLP the election 
of 1976, ushering in Tom Adams (of the BLP) as prime minister at the height of the oil crisis’s 
impact on the real economy. 
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Adams and the BLP largely eschewed heated ideological debates (e.g., Socialism vs. 
Capitalism) in favor of a more measured rhetorical policy approach to the economy. Describing 
Adams’s rhetorical strategy, Beckles (2006) notes that Adams focused on “financial and 
managerial acumen within regional politics, rather than radical socio-cultural dynamism” and 
further, he “promoted an undoubtedly private-sector image for the party and was able to defeat 
the Democratic Labour Party and restore the sagging public confidence and the optimism of the 
professional classes and corporate elites” (Beckles 2006, 283). The transition from Barrow to 
Adams can be seen as a transition from a reactive, anti-black-power rhetorical policy to a 
proactive, pro-business rhetorical policy aimed at increasing the economic prosperity of all. 
Barbadian entrepreneurs took note. In the absence of divisive economic rhetoric, entrepreneurs 
gained even more confidence in the direction of the economy and in the ability of the 
government to dampen the radical sentiment of a working class whose workforce participation 
was integral to the functioning of many businesses, particularly foreign firms and those in the 
tourism and sugar industries. A survey taken of a sample of business owners in 1978 confirms 
the effectiveness of Adams’s approach. When asked, “Is your business doing better today than it 
was in 1974?” nearly two-thirds of respondents answered in the affirmative (Barrow and Greene 
1979, 72). 
Where Jamaica chose rhetorical policy antithetical to entrepreneurial activity, Barbados 
stuck with the rhetorical policies of the free market. The rhetorical policies each country chose 
had real effects on entrepreneurial confidence. And when these rhetorical policies became more 
than mere rhetoric (as we discuss in the next section), the effects in each country grew ever more 
pronounced as entrepreneurs had to contend with laws and actions that either enabled or disabled 
their ability to harness the power of the market. 
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Economic Policies 
 
The spike in oil prices after 1973 caused fiscal difficulties for both Jamaica and Barbados. 
Because both nations are small, open economies, they are uniquely vulnerable to external shocks. 
Each government’s ability to invest in infrastructure development, education, health care, and 
other government programs is a direct function of their ability to maintain a current account 
surplus. Howard (1992) notes that this need for balance “is why governments of small countries 
need to save more, that is, achieve current account surpluses in order to finance capital 
expenditure” (Howard 1992, 11). The oil shock crisis, by increasing the cost of foreign goods 
and making it more costly to produce goods for export, destabilized this balance in both nations.8
The two nations’ adjustment to these problems largely mirrored their rhetorical policies. 
Jamaica increased taxation, levied major industries, created money, and attempted to increase 
exports by nationalizing companies. Barbados, however, took a different approach. While 
Barbados revised its tax policy and also levied at least one major industry (sugar), the 
government did not create money to finance the deficit or nationalize firms with the intent of 
controlling the commanding heights of the economy. Instead, the government provided 
incentives and investment meant to encourage entrepreneurial and firm-level growth. Where 
Jamaica initiated policies largely in conflict with the tenets of industrialization by invitation, 
Barbados continued to pursue such policies. 
 
Immediately following the crisis, both nations raised taxes. The goal of these tax 
increases was to raise revenue and stabilize reserves. While each nation’s short-term goals were 
                                                          
8 For specific numbers on balance of payments and foreign reserves in each nation, see Downes (2001) for Barbados 
and Manley (1987) for Jamaica.  
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the same, their actions differed because of shifting long-term views on the role of the state in the 
economy. The imposition of two levies—one on Jamaica’s bauxite industry and the other on 
Barbados’s sugar industry—provides a comparative illustration of the approach each nation took 
to taxation policy. 
In 1974, following drawn-out negotiations with the five foreign corporations producing 
bauxite in Jamaica, Manley imposed a 7.5 percent levy on the industry in order to raise revenue 
to balance the budget. In addition to imposing the levy, the government purchased 51 percent of 
operations (Stephens 1987). The revenue generated by the levy, though considerable and with 
the potential to alleviate a tenuous fiscal situation, was misspent. Levi (1989) notes that “instead 
of investing all bauxite revenues in a capital development fund, as Manley promised, much of 
the revenue was used shortsightedly, under tremendous domestic political pressure, on current 
expenses” (p. 149). The misspending of the revenue, however, was not the only problem 
surrounding the bauxite levy. Because Manley “unilaterally” imposed the levy, the five foreign 
firms retaliated against the Manley government in their home countries by lobbying politicians 
(members of Congress in the U.S., for example) to reduce foreign aid to Jamaica. Writing in the 
summer of 1977, an analyst for the Heritage Foundation produced a policy brief characterizing 
the negative reaction of foreign entrepreneurs to Manley’s policies: 
One of the principal reasons unemployment has risen substantially and government 
revenues have not been able to meet outlays is the curtailment of new foreign 
investments. The nationalization programs and sometimes strident anti-capitalist rhetoric 
has discouraged any new investment. One financial officer of a large American 
corporation stated quite simply: “We don’t want to get caught like the boys in Cuba, 
where they could take out a suitcase and that’s it.” There is over $1 billion of foreign 
investment in Jamaica, but some of it is closing down, rather than contend with the new 
taxes and regulations (Gayner 1977, 3). 
 
And with respect to the bauxite levy in particular, the policy analyst wrote:  
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With the new tax, Jamaican bauxite becomes the most expensive in the world. This not 
only has discouraged any new investment, but also has precipitated the closing of some 
existing plants in Jamaica, such as, the $90 million Revere Copper and Brass affiliate. 
Revere has charged that the taxes constitute an expropriatory [sic] act and are seeking 
$64.2 million in compensation from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation for 
their facilities in Jamaica (Gayner 1977, 4). 
 
This antagonism directed at Manley’s policies isolated the nation from much-needed foreign 
capital, which declined precipitously during the period (see Table 4). Under Manley, Jamaica 
forgot the benefits of industrialization by invitation, namely the importance of creating a friendly 
environment for foreign business. 
Barbados also imposed a levy, but with fewer detrimental consequences because it had 
the effect of incentivizing industry and its revenue was allocated with prudence. Barrow’s 
rhetoric with regard to the 1975 levy, which he imposed on sugar farmers, revealed that he 
intended to use the levy in order to both finance the deficit and also invest in future growth. The 
administration imposed the levy at a time when the market price for sugar had tripled, providing 
much needed foreign exchange to a country still battling the effects of the oil shock. The Virgin 
Islands Daily News reported that “the money gained from the [Barbadian sugar] levy would be 
allocated for low-interest loans to agriculture for mechanization, diversification and farm 
incentives, to the Barbados Workers Union for a mortgage financing plan and to the National 
Housing Corporation for mortgages and housing construction” (“Sugar Growers” 1975). 
Barbados’s levy on the sugar industry was also distinct from Jamaica’s levy in that it 
avoided a fracas with foreign capitalists. While Western companies made up the bauxite industry 
in Jamaica, mostly local planters managed the sugar industry in Barbados. As such, the levy in 
Barbados was not seen as a broad attack on foreign capital. Moreover, because local sugar 
planters were an integral part of Barbadian society and politics (as opposed to foreign 
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capitalists), the government had a much greater obligation (and political necessity) to ensure 
their fair handling in discussions over and in the execution of the levy. 
 The Barbadian approach to the levy not only helped to buttress business growth 
(particularly when compared with Jamaica’s approach) but also the approach was more effective 
in helping to stabilize the deficit. Barbados did a much better job managing its fiscal deficit to 
GDP ratio in the period 1974 to 1981 (Table 5). According to Worrell, the Governor of the 
Central Bank of Barbados, this success had its underpinnings in Barbados’s handling of its levy 
revenue. Worrell (1995) states: 
The Barbados Government resisted the temptation to create additional 
public service jobs with the [levy] proceeds, keeping the underlying 
budget fairly close to the limit of ordinary revenues. As a result, when 
sugar prices reverted in 1976, the Barbadian Government was able to 
keep the budget deficit within bounds. In contrast Jamaica and Guyana 
had embarked on ambitious job creation and nationalization programmes 
which left Government with large deficits once the windfalls came to an 
end. Financing these deficits led to balance of payments crises with 
inflation, shortages, currency devaluation and loss of real income in 
Jamaica and Guyana. Prudent fiscal policy in Barbados which appeared 
unnecessarily harsh to many Barbadians at the time saved the country 
from a similar fate (9). 
 
This finding suggests that Barbados’s taxation policy was one part of a more effective Barbadian 
stabilization strategy.  
The story of these two levies provides one example of each nation’s corrective approach 
to the oil crisis and, in a larger sense, reflects the shifting policy positions of each nation 
regarding the best economic path forward after a major crisis. In addition to the imposition of the 
levies, each nation altered its corporate tax rates and engaged with entrepreneurs differently in 
order to stabilize their economies. For example, in 1977, Barbados raised its company tax rate 
from 40 percent to 45 percent (Lent 1977; Worrell 1982). On the other hand, Jamaica in 1976 
added a 7.5 percent surcharge on a company tax rate that ranged from 45 to 50 percent (Lent 
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1977). In other words, doing business in Jamaica was 7.5 percent to 12.5 percent more costly 
than doing business in Barbados from a purely tax-based perspective. By 1983, the average 
income tax payment for a person making $20,000 a year amounted to US$5,700 in Barbados and 
US$9,400 in Jamaica.9
 In addition to stabilizing fiscal policy and altering taxation, both countries found it 
imperative to bolster the entrepreneurial initiative of what was becoming their most important 
industry: tourism. The fiscal problems faced by both countries reflected the depressed (and 
negative) profit growth at the industry level. For most industries—including the manufacturing, 
construction, retail, and service industries—energy was a major input of production. As such, the 
oil crisis had the effect of increasing the costs of production, even in Barbados where oil 
production, though it existed, was negligible. Yet the tourism industry was perhaps most 
vulnerable to the oil shock. There, the price of oil affected not only production (in the cost of 
 In addition to taxes, both countries flirted with the nationalization of key 
industries—Jamaica to a far greater extent than Barbados. While Manley conceived of 
nationalization as an opportunity to control and direct the commanding heights of the economy 
in order to permanently alter the socio-economic structure of Jamaica, Adams was very hesitant 
in his nationalization program, choosing to take up holdings in a select few (and mostly, utility) 
companies after “cordial negotiations” and with the clear understanding that “the Government 
had no intention of dominating such ventures but was quite prepared to finance their operations 
on development banking principles” (Hoyos 1988, 104–5). 
                                                          
9 Although the average amount of taxes per person is higher in Jamaica, the tax to GDP ratio is higher in Barbados 
than in Jamaica. Between 1974 and 1976 the tax to GDP ratio was 19.9 percent in Jamaica and 22.7 percent in 
Barbados (Howard 1989). Howard argues that the lower tax to GDP ratio in Jamaica, however, does not reflect a 
“lower incidence of taxation.” In fact, he refers to the Jamaican tax system as “burdensome” and states that “Perhaps 
one reason for the low income tax/GDP ratio in Jamaica has been widespread tax evasion, informal labour activity 
and unincorporated business activity, which are important factors in reducing the taxable base of the economy” 
(Howard 1989, 121). 
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energy and electricity to heat and cool hotel rooms, restaurants, and the like)10
 Barbados experienced its first drop in the number of tourist arrivals in 1975 (see Table 6). 
In 1974, 230,718 tourists visited the island, and in 1975, 221,486 visited. The number of tourist 
arrivals would surpass the 1974 level in 1977, suggesting that the industry was able to bounce 
back fairly quickly. In Jamaica, the industry took longer to rebound. Tourism arrivals peaked at 
432,987 in 1974 and hit a low of 264,921 in 1977—a much more significant drop than in 
Barbados. The Jamaican tourism numbers would not regain their 1974 level until the 1980s. 
Policy choices help to explain the difference. 
 but also 
consumption (in the cost of transportation for travelers). 
Rhetorical policy, of course, plays a role here. Manley’s antagonism toward the West 
certainly played a role in Western perceptions of the island. When Manley was re-elected in the 
late 1980s, one Jamaican voter recalled the Michael Manley of the 1970s, expressing his hope 
that Western tourists no longer feared the nation that once experimented with “communism” of a 
sort. Speaking to a reporter at the Florida newspaper Sun Sentinel, the voter said, “American 
tourists don’t have to fear coming to Jamaica. They don’t have to feel like with Manley the 
communists are in and the Americans are out” (Gibson and Melvin 1989). Moreover, Manley’s 
emphasis on Jamaican self-reliance and Third World independence from the West necessitated a 
shift away from acknowledging and bolstering international tourism as an important part of the 
Jamaican economy. 
Rhetorical policy aside, a couple of key tourism policy differences between the two 
countries also existed. The Jamaican government, through the Minister of Industry, Tourism, and 
                                                          
10 In Barbados, for example, tourism consumed the most electricity—30,491,664 kWh in 1976—of any other 
industry in the country. See Table VIII in Holder (1978). 
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Foreign Trade, pursued two main policies: the nationalization of hotels (many of which were 
insolvent because of decreased demand for rooms) and the promotion of domestic tourism. 
Neither policy proved very effective. Nationalization of hotels proved disastrous, as by 1980 the 
government was left with seventeen hotels that were unprofitable and a drain on the nation’s 
fiscal health (Cowan 1983). Moreover, domestic tourism had mixed success. While domestic 
tourism did increase under Manley’s Domestic Holiday Program, the increase did not make up 
for the decrease in international tourism. Despite the domestic travels of local Jamaicans, the 
number of rooms used by Jamaicans decreased through the period 1976–1980 (Chambers & 
Airey 2010). 
Barbados, on the other hand, stayed the course with its pre-1973 investment in 
international tourist arrivals and enabled the tourism industry by shifting its marketing and 
promotion of tourism toward a more diversified international market. Immediately before the oil 
shock crisis, Barbados had successfully pursued a promotional tourism strategy targeted at 
American and Canadian tourists. One initiative, called the “Barbados Bonanza” of 1964, offered 
potential Canadian tourists exclusive packages for weeklong stays. As a result, the number of 
Canadian visitors rose from 7,000 in the summer of 1963 to 30,000 in the summer of 1966 
(Phillips 1987). But, as in Jamaica, the oil shock crisis depressed the number of tourist arrivals 
and their lengths of stay. Instead of nationalizing hotels or shifting to a domestic tourism 
strategy, Barbados remained committed to its promotion of international tourism and in its 
encouragement of individual hotel entrepreneurs to invest in less costly apartment hotels (rather 
than luxury hotels). Further, the tourism board recognized that diversification was necessary. In 
1973 and 1974, the board’s promotional expenditures shifted away from the U.S. and Canada 
toward the U.K. and other Caribbean countries (particularly Trinidad and Tobago, which had 
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benefited from the spike in oil prices) (Figure 2). The diversification efforts helped the tourism 
industry recover faster without relying on the resurgence of arrivals from the U.S. and Canada, 
which would not come for several more years.11
In addition to its more effective tourism strategy, the government of Barbados also 
understood the oil crisis to be a critical event that necessitated a change in the way it managed its 
energy consumption. Instead of focusing solely on the rationing of energy, the country 
encouraged alternative sources of energy, namely solar energy, and in the process provided 
incentives for entrepreneurial growth. In 1974, Barrow passed the Fiscal Incentives Act, which 
included tax and duty exemptions for solar industries. Later, under Adams, the government 
provided further incentives to two specific solar water heater companies, Solar Dynamics and 
Sunpower Limited. As a result, the solar industry in Barbados exploded, copycat start-ups 
proliferated, and the geographic scope of the sector expanded to other Caribbean countries. The 
University of the West Indies estimated that solar energy use in 2007 reduced imports of fossil 
fuel by 33,000 tons, which translates to US $16 million in savings for a country that spent US 
$208 million on oil imports that same year.
 
12
From taxes and spending to energy and tourism, the economic policy choices of each 
nation affected their entrepreneurial environment. Barbados’s measured fiscal policy, investment 
 According to a journalist’s report at the time the 
study was released, “With almost 30 years of experience under its belt, Barbados is leaps and 
bounds ahead of Bermuda, and the United States for that matter, in the implementation and use 
of solar energy” (Jones 2007). 
                                                          
11 See Phillips (1987) for an in-depth discussion of Barbados’s tourism policy over the years. 
12 Savings data was collected from Jones (2007). Crude oil prices were collected from the Energy Information 
Administration’s 2007 Annual Energy Outlook. Total spent on oil imports in 2007 was collected from MacCulloch 
(2010). 
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in future growth, light taxation policies, and commitment to international tourism all served to 
edge the nation’s economy forward after the oil shock. Jamaica, on the other hand, misallocated 
its revenue, pursued more disabling taxation policies, and chose to alienate Western tourists and 
capital. Paired with economic theory on development and entrepreneurship,13
 
 the data provides 
qualitative evidence to suggest a causal relationship between economic policy choices and 
microeconomic entrepreneurial activity. Our findings suggest that sustained, enabling 
governmental policies can help a small, open economy and its entrepreneurs rebound from an 
exogenous shock. 
Conclusion 
 
Short-term choices have long-run consequences. Jamaica’s policy missteps in response to 
(legitimate) social demands and the oil crisis of the 1970s left a legacy of debt that continues to 
hinder the country’s ability to grow. In 2008/2009, the government of Jamaica spent 53 percent 
of its budget on debt servicing versus 11 percent in Barbados. While Barbados invests heavily in 
health and education, Jamaica is unable to devote comparable resources to productive public 
expenditure (Table 7). The Global Competitiveness Report ranks Barbados 17th globally in terms 
of its level of health and education spending and Jamaica 109th globally (Table 8). The current 
entrepreneurial environments of each nation reflect these differences. With greater ease of doing 
business and less violence and corruption, Barbados enables entrepreneurs to thrive, while 
Jamaica still struggles to encourage entrepreneurial initiative. 
 While it is true, as Eckaus (2002) notes, that the golden rule of growth is that there is no 
golden rule, there exists a clear difference between policy frameworks that enable economic 
                                                          
13 See, for example, Chenery (1980), Wennekers and Thurik (1999), and Kreft and Sobel (2005). 
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activity and those that do not—particularly in the case of small, island economies vulnerable to 
external shocks. From the two islands of Jamaica and Barbados, we find that a positive policy 
framework is one that offers flexibility, encourages innovation and efficiency, and works despite 
volatility in political will. The key to sustained growth in these nations is a commitment to an 
enabling approach that breaks down barriers to productivity, recognizes the importance of 
foreign capital, and allows for the innovation of entrepreneurs. 
27 
 
Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Standards of Living Diverge after the 1973 Oil Shock Crisis 
 
  
Sources: Real GDP per capita data were sourced from the World Development Indicators (WDI) (2011). Where 
WDI data were lacking, Penn World Table 6.1 and the IMF’s World Economic Outlook real GDP per capita growth 
rates were used to close the gaps. 
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Figure 2: Barbados’s 1960–1980 Promotional Expenditure by Locational Destination of 
Funds 
  
 
 
Source: Phillips, E. 1987. “The Development of the Tourist Industry in Barbados 1956–1980.” In The Economy of 
Barbados 1946-1980. Edited by DeLisle Worrell. Central Bank of Barbados. Bridgetown, Barbados. 
 
Table 1:  Economic Policy and Performance Diverge after 1973 Oil Shock Crisis  
 Barbados  Jamaica 
 1966–1972 1973–1980  1962–1972 1973–1980 
Avg. Growth Rate of GDP Per Capita  5.7 2.5  5.1 -4.6 
Fiscal Deficit, percent of GDP 2.7 5.3  2.3 15.5 
Inflation 6.0 14.8  4.4 23.0 
  
Source: Real GDP per capita data from the same data sources as Figure 1. For remaining data, see Henry & 
Miller (2008). 
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Table 2: Composition of Jamaican GDP at Factor Costs, 1950, 1960, 1970  
 1950  1960  1970 
Sector J$M %  J$M %  J$M % 
Agriculture 43.2 31.5  51.9 12.0  78.9 7.4 
Mining * *  41.6 9.6  146.7 13.7 
Manufacturing 15.8 11.5  58.7 13.6  139.8 13.0 
Construction and 
Installation 
10.6 7.7  51.1 11.8  155.7 14.5 
Electricity, Gas, and 
Water 
1.5 1.1  4.5 1.0  11.8 1.1 
Transportation, Storage, 
and Communication 
10.0 7.3  33.4 7.7  62.9 5.9 
Distribution 21.2 15.5  77.8 18.0  179.5 16.7 
Financial Institutions 2.8 2.0  16.2 3.8  43.6 4.1 
Ownership of Dwellings 8.3 6.1  13.5 3.1  104.7 9.8 
Public Administration 7.0 5.1  26.6 6.2  91.6 8.5 
Misc. Services 16.6 12.1  56.3 13.0  57.1 5.3 
Total 137.0 100.0  431.6 100.0  1072.3 100.0 
*The mining sector was virtually nonexistent in 1950. 
Numbers may not add to 100.0% because of rounding. 
Source: Stephens, E. H. and J. D. Stephens. Democratic Socialism in Jamaica: The Political Movement and 
Social Transformation in Dependent Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986: 23. 
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Table 3: Composition of Barbados GDP at Factor Costs, 1955–1970 (%) 
Sector 1955  1960  1970 
Sugar 23.4  21.3  9.9 
Other Agriculture 11.8  6.7  4.8 
Manufacturing 19.2  8.3  10.1 
Construction 7.3  9.8  10.0 
Wholesale/Retail Trade 10.6  23.0  26.0 
Tourism n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Government Other 8.7  9.8  15.6 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0 
Sugar Industry Exports as a 
percentage of total domestic 
exports 
93  93  60 
 
Source: Beckles, Hilary McD. A History of Barbados: From Amerindian Settlement to Caribbean Single Market, 
Second Edition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006: 279. 
 
 
 
Table 4: FDI Net Inflows in Jamaica and Barbados, 1973–1981 (Current $US) 
 Jamaica Barbados 
1973 22.2 4.8 
1974 23.3 2.2 
1975 -1.9 22.2 
1976 -0.6 6.0 
1977 -7.0 4.5 
1978 -26.7 9.1 
1979 -26.4 5.1 
1980 27.6 2.2 
1981 -11.5 7.2 
 
Sources: Jamaican FDI Data: Source - Bank of Jamaica, 2011, Chandar Henry; Barbadian FDI Data: Source - World 
Development Indicators, 2011. 
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Table 5: Ratio of Fiscal Deficit to GDP (%) 
     Jamaica Barbados 
1974 -7.7 -5.3 
1975 -7.8 -2.6 
1976 -15.4 -7.0 
1977 -14.3 -8.3 
1978 -16.6 -2.8 
1979 -13.4 -3.4 
1980 -20.8 -5.2 
1981 -15.6 -8.1 
* Surplus (+), Deficit (-) 
 
Source: Howard, M. “Financing in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago 1974–1984,” Social and Economic 
Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3 (1989): 135. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Tourist Arrivals in Jamaica and Barbados Per Annum (excluding cruise ship 
arrivals) 
 Jamaica Barbados 
1970 309,122 156,417 
1971 359,323 189,075 
1972 407,806 210,349 
1973 418,257 222,080 
1974 432,987 230,718 
1975 395,809 221,486 
1976 327,706 224,314 
1977 264,921 269,314 
1978 381,818 316,883 
1979 426,540 370,916 
 
Sources: Forecasting tourist arrivals in Barbados Author: Dharmaratne G.S. Source: Annals of Tourism 
Research, Volume 22, Number 4 (1995): 804–818(15) Publisher: Elsevier (defined as long-stay tourists); Bank 
of Jamaica, 2011, Chandar Henry, Senior Economist (defined as stopover tourists). 
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Table 7: Composition of 2008/2009 Fiscal Expenditures  (% of Expenditures) 
 Jamaica Barbados 
Education & 
Health 
18 27 
National 
Security 
8 2 
Debt Servicing 53 11 
 
Source: Government of Barbados (2010) and Jamaican Ministry of Finance and the Public Service (2008). 
 
 
 
Table 8: Business and Competitiveness Indicators  
 Jamaica Barbados 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Data  
107/ 142 – Overall Ranking 
106/ 142 – Health & Primary Ed. 
85/ 142 – Higher Ed. & Training 
11.8% mentioned “Corruption” as 
an impediment 
0.9% mentioned “Gov’t Instability” 
42/ 142 – Overall Ranking 
17/ 142 – Health & Primary Ed. 
25/ 142 – Higher Ed. & Training 
0% of respondents mentioned 
“Corruption” or “Gov’t Instability” 
as an impediment to doing business 
 
Doing Business 
Data  
 
88/ 183 – Overall Ranking 
23/ 183 – Starting a Business 
103/ 183 – Registering Property 
172/ 183 – Paying Taxes 
126/ 183 – Enforcing Contracts 
98/ 183 – Getting Credit 
 
N/A 
 
Sources: The 2011–2012 Global Competitiveness Report is constructed by the World Economic Forum, 2011–2012; 
the 2012 Doing Business Report is constructed by the World Bank. 
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